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STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to 
admonish the jury not to transfer the guilt of co-defendant and co-
conspirator Sanchez to Defendant to cure the prosecutor's improper 
statements about the co-defendant's guilty plea during opening 
argument and trial and whether such improper statements prejudiced 
Defendant's right to a fair trial. "Generally, the test used for 
determining whether a prosecutor's statements are improper and 
constitute error is whether the remarks "^called to the jurors' 
attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching a verdict.'" State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) (quoting State 
v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982)) {Johnson overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Roberts, 111 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985)); State 
v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 
110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990)). Appointed trial counsel failed to object to 
such improper statements. However, this issue, for the reasons 
stated below, presents circumstances constituting plain error. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant 
of communications fraud as a second degree felony. When reviewing a 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court views the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
6 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992); State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 
968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 
381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) 
(quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) quoting State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Reversal is appropriate 
"only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)). During closing 
arguments, Defendant's appointed trial counsel argued that the 
evidence is insufficient to justify a conviction for second degree 
communications fraud (See Transcript of Trial, R. 423, lines 4-23). 
3. Whether appointed trial counsel denied Defendant of his 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by 
failing (1) to timely object to the information in which Defendant 
was charged with eight counts of forgery instead of one, and (2) to 
timely object to the conviction of Defendant of both forgery and 
communications fraud because communications fraud is a lesser and 
included offense of forgery, thereby denying Defendant of his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. To make such a 
showing, Defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance, falling below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's 
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performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 
1988) . Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 
(1984). When available, the appellate court defers to the trial 
court's findings of fact, but reviews its application of legal 
principles to its factual findings for correctness. State v. Hay, 
859 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in passim 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in passim 
Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution in passim 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By way of Amended Information filed on August 22, 1996, pursuant 
to Order Consolidating Cases For Trial entered that same day, 
Defendant was charged with eight counts of forgery, all third degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-501, and one count of 
communications fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, a 
second degree felony. Prior to consolidation, Defendant appeared 
with appointed counsel and pleaded not guilty to the aforementioned 
charges. On August 29, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed 
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counsel for jury trial. The jury convicted Defendant on all counts 
as charged. Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel on 
November 18, 1996, for sentencing, at which time the trial court 
sentenced Defendant on the eight counts of forgery to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years, a $5,000 
fine, and an 85% surcharge on each of the eight counts. As to 
communications fraud, the trial court sentenced Defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years, plus 
a $10,000 fine, and an 85% surcharge. The trial court ordered the 
terms to run concurrently and gave credit for time served. On 
November 18, 1996, the trial court signed the Judgment and Commitment 
to the Utah State Prison on November 18, 1996, which was entered that 
same day. Defendant, through appointed trial counsel, filed Notice 
of Appeal on December 17, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. By way of Amended Information filed on August 22, 1996, 
pursuant to Order Consolidating Cases For Trial entered that same day 
(see Order Consolidating Cases For Trial, R. 56), Defendant was 
charged with eight counts of forgery, all third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501, and one count of 
communications fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-10-1801, a 
second degree felony (Amended Information, R. 57-61); 
2. On August 29, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed 
counsel for jury trial (Transcript of Trial, R. 227-444); 
9 
3. During opening statement, the prosecutor stated the 
following: 
This case involves a forged check scheme. 
You are going to hear testimony from five 
witnesses, but one of those witnesses is a young 
lady by the name of Susan Sanchez. Now, Susan 
Sanchez was a co-defendant in this particular 
scheme. She has already been convicted by plea 
and shefll testify to you as to the nature of 
that plea and what consideration she was given 
by the State for purposes of her testimony here 
today and you can evaluate her testimony in 
light of that. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 272, lines 12-19) (Emphasis added); 
4. Defendant's appointed trial counsel waived opening argument 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 276, line 2); 
5. During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the prosecutor 
called Ms. Susan Sanchez, Defendant's co-defendant, as a witness 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 300, lines 16-17) . In the course of 
examining Ms. Sanchez, the following exchange took place: 
MR. WILSON: Now, Susan, itfs my recollection 
that we charged you in connection with this 
matter and that you pled guilty to two third 
degree felony counts; is that correct? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: You also pled guilty to additional 
count or counts in Ogden in Weber County; is 
that correct? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes, I did. 
MR. WILSON: So you are currently serving a 
sentence in respect to the forgeries that are 
before this Court for purposes of this trial? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
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MR. WILSON: Okay. Were any promises made to 
you, Susan, as to other than the agreement that 
we would allow you to plead to two counts and 
dismiss the other counts or any promises made to 
you in connection with your testimony here 
today? 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 75-76) (Emphasis added); 
6. Trial counsel's terse cross-examination of Ms. Sanchez did 
not include any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty 
plea as a co-defendant on charges in the instant case (see Transcript 
of Trial, R. 103-05). Moreover, appointed trial counsel did not ask 
any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty plea even 
after the prosecution recalled Ms. Sanchez as a witness (Transcript 
of Trial, R. 376-80)/ 
7. In the course of closing argument, the prosecutor stated 
the following: 
J think Susan Sanchez was very believable in her 
testimony. You can look at her interest in the 
results of the trial. What did she have to 
gain? She has already been incarcerated as a 
result of her pleading guilty on charges in 
connection with these proceedings, so what what 
was there for her to gain by giving her 
testimony? 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 417) (Emphasis added.); 
8. In response, Defendant's appointed trial counsel, during 
closing argument, stated the following: 
Now, let me specifically tell you what her 
motive is here to lie. She is either protecting 
somebody else or she is going to get a favorable 
treatment. I know no promises have been made to 
her. She is in a State Correctional Facility 
and she is aiding the State. I submit to you 
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she would not be up there today unless she felt 
she was going to get something for it . . . . I 
submit she is going to try and get a benefit 
from this for favorable treatment. She has 
already got a plea bargain that she pled guilty 
to reduced charges. And as I said, I feel that 
she would not be here today unless she felt she 
was going to get something else. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 423-24); 
9. The trial court did not in any way admonish the jury 
against transferring the guilt of co-defendant Sanchez to Defendant; 
10. In the course of the jury trial, the prosecution presented 
evidence of various allegedly forged checks in the amount of 
$3,665.26;1 
11. Jury Instruction No. 16 states the following: 
Before you can convict the defendant, 
Albert Ross, of the crime of communications 
Fraud, as charged in Count Nine of the 
2The checks introduced and admitted as evidence during the 
prosecution's case-in-chief are State's Exhibit No. 1 in the amount 
of $456.00 payable from American International Aerospace 
Manufacturing, Inc., to Randi Gonzales and dated November 2, 1995; 
State's Exhibit No. 2 in the amount of $473.00 payable from American 
International Aerospace Manufacturing, Inc., to Randi Gonzales (dated 
November 2, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 3 in the amount of 395.76 
payable from Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L. Gonzales 
(dated November 6, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 4 in the amount of 
38 9.75 payable from Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L. 
Gonzales (dated November 6, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 5 in the 
amount of $435.00 payable from ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L. Gonzales 
(dated November 13, 1995; State's Exhibit No. 6 in the amount of 
$380.00 payable from ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L. Gonzales (dated 
November 15, 1995; State's Exhibit No. 7 in the amount of 375.00 
payable from Gillies Signs & Design Inc. to Randi L Gonzales (dated 
November 17, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 8 in the amount of $369.75 
payable from Ogden Blueprint and Supply Co. to Randi Gonzales (dated 
November 17, 1995); and State's Exhibit No. 13 in the amount of 
$380.00 payable from Gillies Signs & Design Inc. to Randi L Gonzales 
(dated November 17, 1995) (See envelope of exhibits, R. 450, and 
copies of checks attached hereto as Addenda A). 
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Information, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1. That during the month of November, 
1995, the defendant was in Davis and Weber 
Counties, State of Utah, 
2. That during that time, the defendant 
developed a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain money from another, 
3. That the means used by the defendant 
to obtain the money was false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations or material 
omissions, 
4. That during that time the defendant 
did communicate directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executing 
or concealing the scheme or artifice, 
5. That the value of the property, money 
or thing to be obtained was in excess or 
$5,000.00, 
6. That the defendant acted intentionally 
or knowingly or with reckless disregard for the 
truth. 
If after careful consideration of all of 
the evidence in this case, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements, then you must find 
the defendant, Albert L. Ross, not guilty of 
communications Fraud as charged in Count Nine of 
the Information. If, on the other hand, after 
careful consideration of all the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of 
each and every one of the foregoing elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant, Albert L. Ross, guilty of 
Communications Fraud as charged in Count Nine of 
the Information. 
(Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 16, R. 138-39) (Emphasis 
added); 
12. Jury Instruction No. 17 states the following: 
The statute under which the defendant is 
charged in Count Nine provides, in pertinent 
part, that a person is guilty of Communications 
Fraud if, he has devised any scheme or artifice 
to defraud another or to obtain money, property, 
or anything or value by means of false or 
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fraudulent pretenses, representation, promises, 
or material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing 
the scheme or artifice. 
The determination of the degree of any 
offense for Communications Fraud shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, 
money or things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice. 
Communications Fraud is a felony of the 
second degree when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $5,000.00. 
To communicate means to bestow, convey, 
make known, recount, impart, to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit 
information. Means of communication include but 
are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, 
computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 17, R. 140) (Emphasis 
added); 
13. As part of Defendant's closing argument, appointed trial 
counsel argued the following concerning the communications fraud 
count: 
Now, with the communications fraud counts 
[sic], the very last count I'll just touch on 
briefly. The specific evidence you have with 
regards to this scheme that Susan Sanchez was 
involved in are these eight checks. Total them 
up. They do not total $5,000. They are under 
$5,000. From my position, for that reason alone 
the element of having the value of the property 
or things to be obtained, they have to show it 
was in excess of $5,000. Add those checks up. 
They don't add up to $5,000 worth, but you have 
no evidence of that today. You have no 
specifics as to what checks she cashed above 
those. You don't have the checks in front of 
you. You don't have the amounts on those 
checks. You don't know where they were cashed. 
You don't know who the bank was that they were 
drawn on. Everything else other than the 
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evidence you have today is speculation with 
regards to that count. And for that reason, 
alone, I suggest you should find Mr. Ross not 
guilty on that communications fraud. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 423, lines 4-23); 
14. The prosecutor, in response, argued the following about the 
communications fraud charge: 
Now, the defendant also wants you to 
believe that because we have only shown on these 
eight checks a sum total of some $3,200 that you 
can't find him guilty of the communications 
fraud. Well, regardless of whether he actually 
collected $5,000 from the scheme of not, the 
statute doesn't require that. All the statute 
shows, or requires is that you show an intent. 
Now, if he didn't collect $5,000, why was that? 
It was because he got shut down on November the 
22nd. It wasn't because he didn't have the 
intent or desire to collect the $5,000, because 
they had gone out on multiple occasions and I 
think you can find, you can find from the 
evidence. I mean, if you divide the eight 
checks, the total of the eight checks, you come 
up with an average of $410.63. She said that I 
had been out two to three times a week over that 
three week span and you got anywhere from and 
she said five checks a night, you have got a 
total of 30 checks at that rate, that's well in 
excess at that average. She said also that some 
of the checks were as high as $700, others were 
in the $300 range. 
So there is more than ample evidence to 
show that this defendant intended to collect 
more than $5,000 from this scheme or artifice 
and, in fact, I would submit to you the evidence 
demonstrates that he in fact did based upon what 
Susan Sanchez says. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 428-29); 
15. After deliberating, the jury convicted Defendant as charged 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 205-06; Verdict, R. 100-02; Minute Entry, R. 
180-81) ; 
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16. On November 18, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed 
trial counsel for sentencing, at which time the trial court sentenced 
Defendant on the eight counts of forgery to the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate term of zero to five years, a $5,000 fine, and an 
85% surcharge on each of the eight counts (See Transcript of 
Sentencing, R. 448) . As to communications fraud, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of one to fifteen years, plus a $10,000 fine, and an 85% 
surcharge (See Transcript of Trial, R. 448) . The trial court ordered 
the terms to run concurrently and gave credit for time served 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 448); 
17. On November 18, 1996, the trial court signed the Judgment 
and Commitment to the Utah State Prison on November 18, 1996, which 
was entered that same day (Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State 
Prison, R. 199). Defendant, through appointed trial counsel, filed 
Notice of Appeal on December 17, 1996 (Notice of Appeal, R. 205) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court committed plain error by failing to 
admonish the jury after the prosecutor's improper and uninvited 
statements about the guilty plea of co-conspirator and co-defendant 
Sanchez' to charges arising out of the same circumstances upon which 
defendant's charges arose. By failing to immediately admonish the 
jury, the prosecutor called to the jurors' attention matters which 
they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict. 
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Such an error was harmful because the jury likely transferred the 
guilt of Defendant's co-defendant and co-conspirator to Defendant. 
As a result, Defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair 
trial. 
2. The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the 
conviction of defendant for communications fraud as a second degree 
felony inasmuch as the money obtained or sought to be obtained does 
not exceed $5,000 as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(d). 
There is essentially no evidence, whatsoever, establishing that "the 
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $5,000." Further, the State presented no 
evidence, other than the speculative and unclear testimony of Ms. 
Sanchez, that Defendant sought to obtain property or money in excess 
of statutory requirement of $5,000. As evidenced by the prosecutor's 
specious closing argument about how the statutory amount is 
satisfied, the basis for the second degree communications fraud 
conviction is premised on sufficiently inconclusive, inherently 
improbable, and fatally speculative evidence to the extent that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
3. By failing to timely object to the information through 
which defendant was charged with eight counts of forgery and by 
failing to timely object to defendant's conviction of both forgery 
and communications fraud, appointed trial counsel denied defendant of 
his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
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Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely object fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of 
existing Utah case law and the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-402. But for counsel's deficient performance of failing to object, 
the outcome of Defendant case would have been different. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO 
ADMONISH THE JURY AFTER THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER AND 
UNINVITED STATEMENTS ABOUT CO-CONSPIRATOR AND CO-
DEFENDANT SANCHEZ' GUILTY PLEA TO CHARGES ARISING OUT 
OF THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES FROM WHICH DEFENDANT'S 
CHARGES AROSE, THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
" [A] prosecutor's reference to the guilty plea of a defendant's 
co-conspirator[ ] is plain error and grounds for reversal on appeal, 
even absent objection by defense counsel at the time of the improper 
comment." United States v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 
1979) (citing United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir. 
1977))/2 see also United States v. Hansen, 544 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 
2The Handly Court noted the following concerning such an improper 
reference to a co-conspirator's guilty plea: 
We note that a prosecutor's improper 
reference to a coconspirator's guilty plea is 
very different from the permissible tactic 
commonly employed by prosecutor's where the 
prior record of a government witness is 
introduced in order to take the wind out of the 
defendant's sails regarding the witness' 
credibility. Introducing evidence of a witness' 
prior convictions or guilty pleas, unrelated to 
the defendant, is not prejudicial to the 
defendant, but reference to the guilty pleas of 
that defendant's alleged coconspirators, in the 
very case in which the defendant is then 
standing trial, is obviously capable of 
18 
1977) . "Generally, the test used for determining whether a 
prosecutor's statements are improper and constitute error is whether 
the remarks "^called to the jurors' attention matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict.'" State 
v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Johnson, 
663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 
750, 754 (Utah 1982)) (Johnson overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Roberts, 711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985)); State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 
712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990)). In 
other words, the test is whether the prosecutor's statements, taken 
as a whole in the context of the entire case, prejudicially affected 
substantial rights of the defendant. See generally Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935). 
The issue concerning the prosecutor's improper remarks about the 
guilty plea of Defendant's alleged co-conspirator in the instant 
appeal is raised for the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, the 
failure to raise a timely objection to the prosecutor's remarks 
constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal unless the remarks 
constitute plain error. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785. 
prejudicing his trial. 
United States v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125, 1128 n.l (5th Cir. 1979) 
(emphasis included). 
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In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court outlined the following principles involved in determining 
whether "plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of plain 
error and to obtain appellate relief from an 
alleged error that was not properly objected to, 
the appellant must show the following: (i) An 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996); and State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) . According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 
1989), "in most circumstances, the term ^manifest injustice' [found 
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the ^plain error' 
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). . . ." 
The trial court committed plain error throughout almost every 
phase of the trial by failing to immediately admonish the jurors that 
they were not to transfer the guilt of Defendant's co-defendant and 
co-conspirator to Defendant to correct, if possible, the prosecutor' s 
remarks that called to the jurors' attention the co-conspirator's 
guilty plea.3 Under the circumstances of the instant case, the jurors 
would not be justified in considering the co-defendant and co-
conspirator guilty plea in reaching the verdict. Throughout the 
3In addition, the prosecutor's comments during closing argument 
arguably constitute prosecutorial misconduct (See footnote 11 and 
accompanying text in Argument II below). 
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proceedings the prosecutor referred to co-conspirator and co-
defendant Sanchez' guilty plea. During the opening statement, the 
prosecutor made the following remarks: 
This case involves a forged check scheme. 
You are going to hear testimony from five 
witnesses, but one of those witnesses is a young 
lady by the name of Susan Sanchez. Now, Susan 
Sanchez was a co-defendant in this particular 
scheme. She has already been convicted by plea 
and she'll testify to you as to the nature of 
that plea and what consideration she was given 
by the State for purposes of her testimony here 
today and you can evaluate her testimony in 
light of that. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 272, lines 12-19) (Emphasis added). 
Defendant's appointed trial counsel waived opening argument 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 276, line 2). 
During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the prosecutor called 
Ms. Susan Sanchez, Defendant's co-defendant, as a witness (Transcript 
of Trial, R. 300, lines 16-17) . In the course of examining Ms. 
Sanchez, the following exchange took place: 
MR. WILSON: Now, Susan, itfs my recollection 
that we charged you in connection with this 
matter and that you pled guilty to two third 
degree felony counts; is that correct? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: You also pled guilty to additional 
count or counts in Ogden in Weber County; is 
that correct? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes, I did. 
MR. WILSON: So you are currently serving a 
sentence in respect to the forgeries that are 
before this Court for purposes of this trial? 
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MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. Were any promises made to 
you, Susan, as to other than the agreement that 
we would allow you to plead to two counts and 
dismiss the other counts or any promises made to 
you in connection with your testimony here 
today? 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 75-76) (Emphasis added).4 Then, in the 
course of closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: 
J think Susan Sanchez was very believable in her 
testimony. You can look at her interest in the 
results of the trial. What did she have to 
gain? She has already been incarcerated as a 
result of her pleading guilty on charges in 
connection with these proceedings, so what what 
was there for her to gain by giving her 
testimony? 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 417) (Emphasis added.). 
The prosecutor's remarks and statements about Sanchez' guilty 
plea throughout the course of the trial clearly urged the jury to 
consider, without instruction, the guilty plea of a co-defendant and 
co-conspirator, thereby transferring the guilt of the co-defendant 
and co-conspirator to Defendant. The consideration by the jury of 
Sanchez' guilty plea as substantive evidence of Defendant's guilt is 
a matter that the jury was not justified in considering in reaching 
Appointed trial counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Sanchez did 
not include any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty 
plea (See Transcript of Trial, R. 103-05) . Moreover, appointed trial 
counsel did not ask any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her 
guilty plea even after the prosecution recalled Ms. Sanchez as a 
witness (Transcript of Trial, R. 376-80). 
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the verdict.5 In light of well-settled principles of law involving 
the constitutional right to a fair trial6 and the presumption of 
innocence in criminal trials7 and the blatant nature of the 
prosecutor's remarks,8 it should have been obvious to the trial court 
5In United States v. Hansen, 544 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1977), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted the 
following: 
[T]here is no need to advise the jury or its 
prospective members that some one not in court, 
not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded 
guilty. The prejudice to the remaining parties 
who are charged with complicity in the acts of 
the self-confessed guilty participant is 
obvious. 
Id. at 780 (Emphasis added.). 
6The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." 
7Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) provides that "[a] defendant in a 
criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In the absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted." 
8In State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme 
Court, in the course of discussing the duty of prosecutors to eschew 
all improper tactics, noted the following: 
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative 
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation 
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, 
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. 
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not 
at liberty to strike foul one. It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as 
it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
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that the prosecutor's statements called to the jurors' attention 
matters they were not justified in considering. 
With respect to whether the error was harmful, it should be 
noted that the evidence against Defendant in the instant case is not 
compelling. Almost the entire case presented against Defendant was 
built on the self-serving testimony of Sanchez, Defendant's co-
defendant and alleged co-conspirator. To suggest to the jury that 
the guilt of a co-defendant and co-conspirator be transferred to 
Defendant is to introduce a powerful and inappropriate factor into 
the jury's deliberative process. Cf. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786. In 
cases such as the one at bar, the substantive use of a co-defendant's 
and co-conspirator's guilty plea can tilt the balance in favor of 
conviction. Id. Such is the case here. Consequently, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that absent the error a different result would 
have occurred. 
II. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT FOR COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
AS A SECOND DEGREE FELONY INASMUCH AS THE MONEY 
OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE OBTAINED DOES NOT EXCEED 
$5,000 AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1801(1) (d) . 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the 
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992); 
Id. at 787 (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 557 (Utah 1987) 
(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633 
(1935) ) . 
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State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State 
v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate "only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)). 
The foregoing standard applies even where much of the evidence 
is circumstantial. State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (citing State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) and 
State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah 1986)). As a matter of 
well-settled law, "circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 
establish the guilt of the accused." See Nickles, 728 P.2d at 126. 
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict "if it is of Asuch 
quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'" Span, 819 P.2d at 332 (quoting Nickles, 728 
P.2d at 127) . However, the following standard applies when the 
evidence consists solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence: 
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to 
determine (1) whether there is any evidence that 
supports each and every element of the crime 
charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can 
be drawn from that evidence have a basis in 
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logic and reasonable human experience sufficient 
to prove each legal element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is 
not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or 
speculative possibilities of guilt. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). 
Furthermore, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, 
a "Md]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient.'" 
Hayes, 860 P.2d at 972 (quoting State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). In 
the instant case, Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and 
then persuade the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the 
State failed to prove that he was a was guilty of second degree 
communications fraud. See State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(c) provides that anyone guilty of 
communications fraud is guilty of "a third degree felony when the 
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sough to be 
obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000. . . ." 
Subsection (1)(d), in contrast, provides for a communications fraud 
penalty of "a second degree felony when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds 
$5,000. . . ." 
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To convict Defendant of communications fraud as a second degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1) (d) , the State had to 
prove that "the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000. . . ." The State, as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501,9 had the burden to prove each 
of the aforementioned elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The evidence supporting the second degree communications fraud 
conviction consists of the following: (1) Evidence presented by the 
prosecutor during the prosecution's case-in-chief of various 
allegedly forged checks that total $3,665.26;10 and (2) Testimony of 
9Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "elements 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state 
required. 
The checks introduced and admitted as evidence during the 
prosecutor's case-in-chief are State's Exhibit No. 1 in the amount of 
$456.00 payable from American International Aerospace Manufacturing, 
Inc., to Randi Gonzales (dated November 2, 1995) (Transcript of 
Trial, R. 291-93; R. 450); State's Exhibit No. 2 in the amount of 
$473.00 payable from American International Aerospace Manufacturing, 
Inc., to Randi Gonzales (dated November 2, 1995) (Transcript of 
Trial, R. 279-80; R. 450); State's Exhibit No. 3 in the amount of 
395.7 6 payable from Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L. 
Gonzales (dated November 6, 1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 280-81; R. 
450); State's Exhibit No. 4 in the amount of 389.75 payable from 
Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L. Gonzales (dated November 6, 
1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 281-82; R. 450); State's Exhibit No. 
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co-defendant, Sanchez, that was elicited by the prosecutor in the 
course of the following direct examination: 
MR. WILSON: Okay. Now you indicated that on 
that first occasion you probably cashed three or 
four checks, is that correct? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Uh-huh. Yes. 
MR. WILSON: Did you have occasion to go out at 
any other time and cash checks during the month 
of November? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
MR. WILSON: Can you remember approximately how 
many times you went out and cashed checks? 
MS. SANCHEZ: It had to have been about two or 
three time a week. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. And on each of those 
occasions, do you remember how many checks you 
would cash on each occasion, the approximate 
number? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Five. 
MR. WILSON: Five? Okay. Did this check 
cashing go on in Weber County and Davis County? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
5 in the amount of $435.00 payable from ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L. 
Gonzales (dated November 13, 1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 293-95/ 
R. 450)/ State's Exhibit No. 6 in the amount of $380.00 payable from 
ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L. Gonzales (dated November 15, 1995) 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 295/ R. 450)/ State's Exhibit No. 7 in the 
amount of 375.00 payable from Gillies Signs & Design Inc. to Randi L 
Gonzales (dated November 17, 1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 282-83/ 
R. 450)/ State's Exhibit No. 8 in the amount of $369.75 payable from 
Ogden Blueprint and Supply Co. to Randi Gonzales (dated November 17, 
1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 295-96/ R. 450)/ and State's Exhibit 
No. 13 in the amount of $380.00 payable from Gillies Signs & Design 
Inc. to Randi L Gonzales (dated November 17, 1995) (Transcript of 
Trial, R. 340-41/ R. 450) (See envelope of exhibits, R. 450, and 
copies of checks attached hereto as Addenda A/ see also testimony of 
Susan Sanchez, Transcript of Trial, R. 314-18). 
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MR. WILSON: Okay. Can you tell us what cities 
that you recall you cashed checks in? 
MS. SANCHEZ: It was Ogden, Roy and out at South 
Ogden. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. Did you cash any in Davis 
County, any cities in Davis County that you 
recall? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: Do you remember what cities it was 
[sic]? 
MS. SANCHEZ: I don't. 
• * * • 
MR. WILSON: Okay. Can you tell us the 
approximate amount that these checks would be 
made out for? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Some had been made out for $700, 
some would be made out for $300. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 312-14). 
The prosecutor, in response to defense counsel's argument about 
the insufficiency of evidence for a second degree communications 
fraud conviction, argued the following about the communications fraud 
charge: 
Now, the defendant also wants you to 
believe that because we have only shown on these 
eight checks a sum total of some $3,200 that you 
can't find him guilty of the communications 
fraud. Well, regardless of whether he actually 
collected $5,000 from the scheme of not, the 
statute doesn't require that. All the statute 
shows, or requires is that you show an intent. 
Now, if he didn't collect $5,000, why was that? 
It was because he got shut down on November the 
22nd. It wasn't because he didn't have the 
intent or desire to collect the $5,000, because 
they had gone out on multiple occasions and I 
think you can find, you can find from the 
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evidence. I mean, if you divide the eight 
checks, the total of the eight checks, you come 
up with an average of $410.63. She said that I 
had been out two to three times a week over that 
three week span and you got anywhere from and 
she said five checks a night, you have got a 
total of 30 checks at that rate, that's well in 
excess at that average. She said also that some 
of the checks were as high as $700, others were 
in the $300 range. 
So there is more than ample evidence to 
show that this defendant intended to collect 
more than $5,000 from this scheme or artifice 
and, in fact, I would submit to you the evidence 
demonstrates that he in fact did based upon what 
Susan Sanchez says. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 428-29).n 
In the instant case, there is essentially no evidence, 
whatsoever, establishing that "the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000."12 
Further, the State presented no evidence, other than the speculative 
and unclear testimony of Ms. Sanchez, that Defendant sought to obtain 
property or money in excess of statutory requirement of $5,000. In 
21The prosecutor's comments, for the reasons set forth below, 
arguably constitute prosecutorial misconduct inasmuch as they are 
based on the testimony by Ms. Sanchez that the check cashing took 
place in both Weber County and Davis County, not to mention that the 
prosecution failed to produce any checks to support its theory of how 
the second degree statutory amount is met. See State v. Troy, 688 
P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (holding that comment by a prosecutor 
during closing argument that the jury consider matters outside the 
evidence is prosecutorial misconduct); see also State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 339, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Thus, even if the misstatements 
were not ^obvious,' we would w'dispense with the obviousness 
requirement so that justice can be done.'") (quoting State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989)). 
"Especially troubling, is the total lack of physical evidence 
of the checks that the prosecutor argued make up the difference to 
establish the amount in excess of $5,000 for a second degree 
communications fraud conviction. 
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fact, Ms. Sanchez, as the State's own witness, incontrovertibly 
testified that the check cashing occurred in both Weber County and 
Davis County (see Transcript of Trial, R. 313, lines 13-14), which, 
in and of itself, raises jurisdictional questions for purposes of the 
statutory requirement for the second degree communications fraud 
conviction. As evidenced by the prosecutor's specious closing 
argument about how the statutory amount is satisfied, the basis for 
the second degree communications fraud conviction is premised on 
sufficiently inconclusive, inherently improbable, and fatally 
speculative evidence to the extent that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. "Criminal convictions cannot rest on 
conjecture or supposition; they must be established by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt." See Workman, 852 P.2d at 987 (noting that the 
State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred 
constitutional safeguards at its core"). Consequently, the State 
failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is 
required to do. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. This follows even 
when the evidence supporting the second degree communications fraud 
conviction is viewed is a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
III. BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE INFORMATION THROUGH 
WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH EIGHT COUNTS OF 
FORGERY AND BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION OF BOTH FORGERY AND COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, 
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED DEFENDANT OF HIS SIXTH 
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AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test for 
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment13 right to effective 
assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 
1064. Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To prevail, a 
defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Bundy 
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995) 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah App. 1995). "[T]he right 
to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused 
to receive a fair trial.'' Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, , 
113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"^identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
*show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
13The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states 
in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). 
A defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, 
denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceedings would have been different.7' Strickland, 4 66 U.S. 
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994); Frame, 723 P.2d at 
405. In the process of arriving at this determination, the appellate 
court "should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into 
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire 
evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the 
verdict is supported by the record." Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. 
A. CONSOLIDATION OF FORGERY COUNTS 
In the instant case, appointed trial counsel's failure to timely 
object to the Amended Information in which Defendant was charged with 
eight counts of forgery fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law 
and the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1). Section 76-
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1-402 states that "when the same act of a defendant under a single 
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such provision." 
In State v. Kimbel 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "embezzlement over a period of time may be 
found to constitute one continuous transaction" and therefore one 
offense. The court further stated: 
[T]he general test as to whether there are 
separate offenses or one offense is whether the 
evidence discloses one general intent or 
discloses separate and distinct intents. The 
particular facts and circumstances of each case 
determine this question. If there is but one 
intention, one general impulse, and one plan, 
even though there is a series of transactions, 
there is but one offense. 
Id. (quoting People v. Howes, 222 P.2d 969 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)); see 
also State v. Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985) (holding that acts 
of embezzlement over two-month span charged as single offense). 
The evidence in the instant case demonstrates that although the 
transactions underlying Defendant's forgery convictions occurred over 
a three week period of time, they were part of a single plan14 that 
happened in the same manner or operation and should have been charged 
as one offense (See Transcript of Trial, R. 309-14). Cf. State v. 
Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996). In fact, except for minor 
14Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 provides that "^single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective." 
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differences as to the amounts and accounts of the checks, the Amended 
Information charging Defendant and the instructions given to the jury 
make no essential distinction between the eight counts (See Amended 
Information, R. 57-61; Jury Instructions, R. 128-35) . But for 
counsel's deficient performance of failing to object to the Amended 
Information, the eight counts of forgery would have been consolidated 
into one count. 
B. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
Appointed trial counsel's additional failure to timely object to 
Defendant being convicted of both forgery and communications fraud 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
in light of existing Utah case law and the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). According to § 76-1-402(3), in relevant 
part, "[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the 
offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged 
and the included offense. An offense is so included when . . . [i]t 
is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged. . . . "15 
In other words, the two crimes must be "*such that the greater cannot 
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser.'" 
15Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution also prohibit the 
imposition of separate sentences for lesser included offenses. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that no 
person shall "be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense" while 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb." 
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State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Baker, 
671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983)). In Hill, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another 
offense is determined "by comparing the statutory elements of the two 
crimes as a theoretical matter and, where necessary, by reference to 
the facts proved at trial." Id.; see also State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 
1234, 1236 (Utah 1990); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah 
1987) . 
The elements of forgery are set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-
501(1)(a) and (b), which states: 
A person is guilty of forgery if, with 
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without 
his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that 
the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or 
place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
In comparison, the elements of communications fraud are set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), which states: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who communicates directly or 
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indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice is guilty of . . • . 
(c) a third degree felony when the value 
of the property, money, or thing obtained 
or sought to be obtained is or exceeds 
$1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value 
of the property, money, or thing obtained 
or sought to be obtained is or exceeds 
$5,000 . . . . 
Subsection (6) further provides that >x[t]o communicate . . . means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit information" and "[m]eans 
of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and 
spoke and written communication." 
A comparison of the elements, as set forth above, indicates that 
communications fraud is established by proof of the same or less than 
all the facts required to establish the commission of forgery. Based 
on this comparison, forgery cannot be committed without necessarily 
having committed communications fraud and thus communications fraud 
is a lesser and included offense of forgery. Cf. State v. Bradley, 
752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1988). 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely object to the 
conviction of both forgery and communications fraud fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of 
existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-1-
402(3), and the aforementioned Utah case law previously set forth. 
But for counsel's deficient performance of failing to object, 
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Defendant would not have been convicted of both forgery and the 
lesser and included offense of communications fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse Defendant's convictions and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's directions as stated in its 
opinion. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and 
novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with prosecutorial 
misconduct, insufficiency of evidence for a conviction of second 
degree communications fraud, and double jeopardy, which are matters 
of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the 
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the 
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and 
public. Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fflh daY of June, 1997. 
XARNbLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
Attorneys ^"ror Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATEJDF .UTAH
 pu inr 
FAPMTNr,TnNT n P P A R T M P N T NOV 10 L 51 iFl JO FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
Br ^ JUDGMENT AND COMMrTMJCNT 
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON 




Case No. 961700418 
That whereas said defendant, having plead guilty to the crimes of forgery, third degree 
felonies (8 counts) and communications fraud, a felony of the second degree (one count), and 
now being present in Court accompanied by his attorney and ready for sentence, thereupon 
the Court renders its judgment. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
On the 8 counts of forgery, the defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of 0 to 5 years and fined $5,000 plus 85% surcharge. On the charge of 
communication fraud, the defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of 1 to 15 years and fined $10,000 plus 85% surcharge. The Board of Pardons will 
determine the amount of fines to be paid by the defendant. 
Court recommendations: These sentences are to be served concurrently. The Court 
would recommend the defendant be given credit for time served of 55 days. 
Dated November 18, 1996, with the Seal of the Court affixed hereto. 
BY THE COURT: 
J^tftf. S£c\ District Court Judge 
f&S t<X \ ° % PAULA CARR 
* 2 7 '.<?v \ c . % Clerk of Court 
\ \ * x < , V By -^jUJl^ ^LiAllJ_ 
V ??\<$r**' Kathy PowelU 
^ ^ N v v v v v * ^ Deputy Clerk 
